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Abstract 
Research on the status and experience of women in academia in the last 30 years has challenged 
conventional explanations of persistent gender inequality, bringing into sharp focus the cumulative impact 
of small scale, often unintentional differences in recognition and response: the patterns of ‘post-civil rights 
era’ discrimination made famous by the 1999 report on the status of women in the MIT School of Science. 
I argue that feminist standpoint theory is a useful resource for understanding how this sea change in 
understanding gender inequity was realized. At the same time, close attention to activist research on 
workplace environment issues suggests ways in which our understanding of standpoint theory can 
fruitfully be refined. I focus on the implications of two sets of distinctions: between types of epistemic 
injustice (and correlative advantage) that may affect marginalized knowers; and between the resources of 
situated knowledge and those of a critical standpoint on knowledge production.  
 
 
When the MIT report, ‘Women in the School of Science,’ appeared in 1999, the terms of public 
debate about the status of women in science, and in academia generally, were fundamentally reframed. 
What the authors of this report declared, with electrifying effect, was that discrimination in the ‘post-civil 
rights era’ is subtle but no less effective for all that. They reported inequities in resources and support 
and, crucially, in outcomes for women that persist even in the absence of intentional discrimination. 
Discrimination in the 1990s, they argued, takes the form of innumerable small differences in uptake and 
response: ‘a pattern of powerful but unrecognized attitudes and assumptions that work systematically 
against women despite good will’ (MIT 1999, 11). Although individual incidents may seem to be trivial, 
cumulatively they translate into patterns of ‘exclusion and invisibility’ that can have a substantial impact 
on the quality of women’s work life, their effectiveness in the workplace, and their career trajectories 
compared to those of similarly well trained and accomplished men (1999, 8).  
The authors of the MIT report contrast these contemporary patterns of marginalization with the 
forms of explicit sex discrimination that had been addressed, in the United States, by executive orders 
(for federal contractors) and landmark equal opportunity legislation instituted in the late 1960s and early 
1970s.1 In the background is a conventional framework for explaining persistent gender inequality in 
academia that was articulated in particularly clear and influential terms by Jonathan Cole in Fair Science 
(1979), and reiterated nearly thirty years later by Lawrence Summers (then President of Harvard), in his 
infamous remarks about women’s lack of capacity for careers in science (2005). On Cole’s account, 
absent evidence of intentional discrimination, gender imbalances in the representation of women must 
reflect differences in the choices they make and in their accomplishments. Women must be self-selecting 
out of the sciences at higher rates than men and, when they do persist, he argued that gender differences 
in outcome (progress through the ranks, recognition, compensation) can all be explained by lower levels 
of productivity among women, compared to men, that cannot be accounted for by marital or parental 
status. Summers filled the explanatory lacunae in this account with the conventional wisdom that these 
patterns persist because women typically lack the necessary intellectual talent and drive to succeed in 
science (2005). Although Cole and Summers focus on women in science, these presuppositions surface, 
in field-specific terms, across academic disciplines and the professions. 
 
1 For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act that was passed in 1972 struck down exemptions from the 
equal-employment-opportunity laws that had been granted to educational institutions under Title VII) (Rossiter 1995, 
376), while Title IX extended the Equal pay Act of 1963 to higher education and banned sex discrimination in any 
institution receiving federal funding (Rossiter 1995, 382). With this legislation in place there was tremendous 
optimism, for the next decade, that gains in the academic training pipeline would translate into steady improvement in 




Although Cole’s account has been canonical in many contexts, he did face sharp criticism at the 
time. Margaret Rossiter published a prescient review of Fair Science in 1981, objecting that Cole ‘seemed 
unwilling to face his own evidence’ (101).2 She reads his analysis against the grain, reinterpreting his 
statistical results—his distributional data—as evidence that women in science might be facing a persistent 
pattern of underestimation and marginalization such that ‘the rate of exchange’ (Cole’s terms) by which 
they built research careers and reputations was different than for men; they received less recognition, 
compensation, and support for the same kinds of training, institutional affiliation, and track record of 
accomplishments, with ramifying consequences. She cites, in this connection, a growing body of research 
on evaluation bias that Cole had not considered,3 and urged consideration of a richer set of explanatory 
possibilities for the patterns of underrepresentation he reported. It should be a priority, she argued, to ‘try 
to understand the attitudes and behavior patterns that lie behind the distributional data’ (1981, 103, 
emphasis added).  
In the next 15 years an enormous body of grass roots activist research took shape that was 
animated by the suspicion, articulated by Rossiter, that the sciences, and academia generally, were not 
fair, not quite the level playing field that Cole maintained. Women reported innumerable ways in which 
institutional and disciplinary environments put them at a disadvantage, deflecting them from academic 
careers or marginalizing them within academia, even as they entered and succeeded in graduate 
programs at unprecedented rates. The MIT report is a recent and especially high profile outcome of a 
process that had unfolded over and over again in diverse academic and disciplinary settings since the 
early 1980s. A growing awareness of dissonance between their experience as women in academia and 
their expectations that academia is a meritocracy—that intellectual talent and contributions would be 
recognized and rewarded regardless of gender or race or other markers of social difference—focused 
their attention, often with great reluctance, on characteristic features of what came to be known as the 
‘chilly climate’ for women in academia (Hall and Sandler 1982, 1984, Sandler 1986). Working groups and 
ad hoc committees undertook finegrained studies of local dynamics of interaction that might account for 
the persistent disparities in women’s rates of appointment, promotion, compensation, and in other 
measures of academic outcome that were being documented at an institutional, discipline-wide, and 
national level. The results were typically reported in internal institutional self-studies, the reports of 
committees on the status of women, and pamphlets circulated by feminist research institutes. Often these 
reports provoked sharply hostile responses that reiterated, or presupposed, Cole’s explanatory framework 
(e.g., Michell and Backhouse 1995, 138-142): if intention to discriminate could not be demonstrated, there 
were no grounds for attributing unfairness to the institutions of science or to the academic communities in 
which women continued to find themselves on the ‘outer circle’ (Zuckerman et al. 1991), ‘outsiders in the 
sacred grove’ (Aisenberg and Harrington 1988).  
I argue that feminist standpoint theory is a useful resource for understanding the transformative 
shift in thinking about ‘women, work and the academy’4 marked by the MIT report, as well as resistance to 
the central insights of ‘chilly climate’ studies that continues even as these are vindicated by the results of 
mainstream (professional) research in cognitive psychology and sociology. Reformulated in non-
essentialist, pragmatic terms, feminist standpoint theory provides a framework for understanding why it 
was so difficult to identify and delineate patterns of epistemic injustice in academic institutions and how, in 
some cases, these very patterns of marginalization conferred epistemic advantage on those who were 
disadvantaged by them, putting them in a position to recognize and to document phenomena that were 
rendered inscrutable by the normative ideals of academic meritocracy.5 At the same time, chilly climate 
research puts productive pressure on some key assumptions of standpoint theory, drawing attention to 
various kinds of epistemic advantage that may accrue to those who are marginalized in different ways 
 
2 See also Harrison White who objected that, as a ‘patriotic citizen of science,’ Cole had begged the question of the 
fairness of science, lacking the data and the controls necessary to establish his favored conclusions (1982, 951). 
3 As Rossiter points out, a number of controlled studies were available to Cole that documented systematic 
differences in the ways Curriculum Vitae are evaluated if they are attributed to women as opposed to men. One 
especially influential example was Lewin and Duchan’s 1971 article in Science; Tosi and Einbender provide an 
overview of work along these lines that had appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s (1985). 
4 The substantive details of this shift are outlined below, and summarized in report on the current state of research on 
equity issues for women in the academy, Women, Work, and the Academy (Wylie, Jakobsen, Fosado 2007). 
5 In complementary analyses (this volume), Fehr considers the epistemic advantages that may accrue to situational 
diversity as well as the impediments to its uptake in a research community, and Rooney takes up these issues 
reflexively, with respect to epistemology. 
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(socially and epstemically), and sharpening an implicit distinction between the resources of situated 
knowledge and those of a critical standpoint on knowledge production. I turn first to a characterization of 
standpoint theory, then expand on the sketch I have given of how gender inequity has been 
reconceptualized in the last 25 to 30 years. I conclude with an analysis of the epistemic implications of 
this example of a hard-won shift in collective understanding that was mobilized by insights from the 
margins.  
 
8.1 Standpoint Theory and Epistemic Injustice  
 
I find it useful to think of standpoint theory as one instance of a broader genre: a form of social 
epistemology that focuses attention on the social conditions—the composition and dynamics of epistemic 
communities—by which knowledge production and authorization can be systematically skewed. It is, 
then, a theory of epistemic injustice in the sense usefully elaborated by Miranda Fricker (2006, 2007), that 
focuses attention on ways in which epistemic practice can be improved, given a robust appreciation of the 
epistemic advantages that may accrue to those who are otherwise marginalized.  
Epistemic injustice is a form of systematic epistemic misrecognition; it arises, Fricker argues, 
when norms of credibility ‘imitate structures of social power’ (Fricker 1998, 170, 172), so that our socially 
inflected ‘working indicators’ of rational authority pick out the powerful and not necessarily the 
knowledgeable or the truthful. These patterns of misrecognition generate two kinds of epistemic injustice 
that are relevant for current purposes. The first takes root when members of socially recognized 
categories or communities—defined, for example, by gender, race, ethnic or religious affiliation, sexual 
identity, age, class—find that their competence is always in question, no matter what their epistemic 
credentials or track record. This is what Fricker describes as testimonial injustice (2007, 1, 9-29). In this 
case it is epistemic agents who are misrecognized (qua members of social kinds); they are not accorded 
the rational authority they deserve given their identification with subdominant or disvalued ‘social kinds,’ 
even if the epistemic claims they make take a form or have content that is conventionally recognized and 
valued as knowledge.6 Sometimes such injustice is deliberate; it is a matter of intentional imposture as 
credible, or of a cynical refusal to attribute epistemic authority to those who are socially marginal, 
whatever evidence or arguments they may bring to bear.7 Often such misrecognition is inadvertent; in 
cases of ‘credibility overspill’ attributions of competence overreach the limits of the expertise marked by 
working indicators, and the reverse in cases of credibility deficit, without anyone intending or even 
noticing (Fricker 1998, 169).  
A second type of misrecognition, which Fricker refers to as ‘hermeneutical injustice,’ is a function 
of systematic gaps in the interpretive resources available to epistemic agents that put those who are 
marginal socially and materially at an epistemic disadvantage, not just testimonially but also conceptually 
and communicatively. Hermeneutical injustice (2007, 147-161) becomes entrenched when dominant 
norms of credibility and ‘interpretive habits’ render unintelligible any distinctive forms of experience or 
understanding that those in marked social categories may develop as a consequence of their social 
location. As Fricker describes this, ‘relations of unequal power can skew shared hermeneutical resources 
so that the powerful tend to have appropriate understandings of their experience ready to drawn on as 
they make sense of their social experiences, whereas the powerless are more likely to find 
themselves…with at best ill-fitting meanings to draw in the effort to render [their experience] intelligible’ 
(2007, 148). While conceptually distinct, these two types of epistemic injustice reinforce one another in 
obvious ways. For example, when there is pressure on norms of credibility to track power, the ability of 
those on the margins to advocate their knowledge and trustworthiness is diminished, especially in areas 
where what they know does not conform to dominant cultural norms (Fricker 1998, 169). By extension, 
when dominant groups are in a position to ‘project their experience as representative of everyone in 
society…often [as] an unconscious act’ (McConkey 2004, 202), they also project, well beyond the 
contexts where they originate, working indicators that sanction not just familiar kinds of knowers, but also 
the forms of knowledge and norms of plausibility associated with them. As McConkey’s observation 
suggests, working indicators of competence and of plausibility are most effective, and most invidious—
 
6 I have in mind, here, a conception of social kinds as contingently constituted by looping effects of the sort 
characterized by Hacking (1999, 34, 103-104). See also Moya (2000). 
7 Derrick Bell’s ‘Rules of Racial Standing’ is a particularly stark and compelling account of how epistemic injustice of 
this kind operates (1992, 109-126). 
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most impervious to change—when they take root in the attributional heuristics on which we depend to 
navigate the social world. In this case, ‘habits of epistemically charged social perception’ (Fricker 2007, 5) 
become socially charged habits of epistemic judgment that are content-laden, tuned to interpretive 
resources that reflect the interests and experience of the powerful.  
Misrecognition of both kinds—of subdominant knowers and of subdominant forms of 
knowledge—is properly described as epistemic injustice when, or to the extent that, socially defined 
categories of people and their distinctive forms of knowledge are systematically excluded from 
participation in an epistemic practice—from the ‘rhetorical spaces’ in which their claims could be heard 
and systematically adjudicated.8   
The central tenets of feminist standpoint theory converge on this account of epistemic injustice at 
a number of key points.9 First, and most important for the analysis that follows, both presuppose a 
situated knowledge thesis, where the situatedness of epistemic agents is construed in structural terms 
rather than as a matter of individual perspective or idiosyncratic skills and talents. In short: what 
individuals experience and understand is (contingently) shaped by systems of social differentiation that 
structure and are, in turn, structured by the material conditions of their lives, the relations of production 
and reproduction that condition their social interactions, and the cultural and conceptual resources 
available to them for representing and interpreting these relations.10  
Second, standpoint theorists are typically concerned not only with the epistemic effects of 
positionality or situatedness (social location), but with our differential capacity to develop the kind of 
standpoint on knowledge production that is a ‘project’ (Weeks 1996, 101): a critical consciousness of the 
conditions under which knowledge is produced and authorized, and of the difference that our 
situatedness makes to epistemic agency.11 Standpoint theory is itself such a project, animated by a 
commitment to understand how power relations inflect knowledge—what epistemic limitations or 
advantages accrue to epistemic agents as a function of their location in and negotiation of structured 
systems of social relations—especially where there is a mismatch between the epistemic resources of 
socially marginal or subdominant agents and the credibility ascribed to them on the basis of conventional 
norms of credibility. 
Finally, and most controversially, standpoint theory is characterized by an ‘inversion’ thesis. A 
central tenet of standpoint theory is that those who are marginalized (socially, politically, economically), 
and who suffer epistemic injustice as a consequence may, in fact, be epistemically advantaged in key 
respects. This is a matter of shifting the emphasis from analysis of the epistemically disabling effects of 
systemic inequality to a consideration of epistemic resources (evidence and experience) that are ignored 
or discounted as a consequence of testimonial injustice,12 and to distinctive insights that may arise from 
non-mainstream experience and the struggle to understand and communicate it. In short, standpoint 
theory focuses attention on ways in which the experience of those on the margins may put them in a 
position to know different things, or to know some things better, than those who are comparatively 
privileged and whose status secures for them more automatic and more comprehensive epistemic 
credibility.  
It is important to note that, on this formulation of the inversion thesis, the types of epistemic 
advantage posited by standpoint theory are localized and contingent. Standpoint theory need not and, 
here, does not presuppose an essentialist conception of the social kinds in terms of which standpoints are 
 
8 The term ‘rhetorical spaces’ comes from Code (1995). See Fricker (2007, 157-158) for a discussion of this 
requirement of systematicity in relation to hermeneutical injustice. 
9 This analysis and reformulation of feminist standpoint theory is developed in more detail in Wylie (2003).  
10 Fricker usefully distinguishes between three senses of ‘structured’ that figure in Hartsock’s formulation of the 
central claims of standpoint theory (1983): an agent’s resources may be structured in a material, an ontological, and 
an epistemic sense (2007: 147). I mean to indicate here the interdependence of structuring forces in these three 
senses.   
11 For example, Nancy Hartsock makes the point that ‘a standpoint is not simply an interested position (interpreted as 
bias) but is interested in the sense of being engaged’ (1983, 285); it is a matter of developing an ‘oppositional 
consciousness...which takes nothing of the dominant culture as self-evidently true’ (1997, 96-97). In a similar spirit, 
Fricker observes that a standpoint is ‘the epistemic counterpart of a particular form of “engagement” with the world’: it 
is ‘not itself a social positioning…[but] something that is made available from the relevant social positioning’ (1999, 
194). 
12 See, for example, Sunstein’s discussion of the epistemic costs of conformity to a dominant perspective or world 
view (2003, 5-9 and throughout). 
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characterized, nor a claim that these standpoints confer categorical or comprehensive epistemic 
privilege.13 Where the risk of essentialism is concerned, on this account it is an entirely contingent matter 
whether lines of social differentiation obtain that are robust enough to make a systematic difference to 
what epistemic agents are likely to know, or know well. That is to say, for social kinds to be epistemically 
salient, they need not approximate an implausible essentialist ideal of internal homogeneity, external 
boundedness, and stability. All that is required is that the structures of social inequality that create and 
sustain social kinds should establish similarities in social experience in a given context—for example, 
through patterns of socialization, education, and work (relations of production and reproduction)—make a 
systematic difference in the ways epistemic capacities are developed and epistemic resources distributed 
in that context. Moreover, even when there are grounds for recognizing that social difference is 
epistemically salient, this does not sustain any comprehensive assumption of credibility, superior insight, 
or ‘incorrigibility’ (Narayan 1988, 37). Any distinctive angle of vision, experience, or critical perspective 
associated with social marginality will confer advantage only contingently, and only with respect to 
specific epistemic problems.14  
Epistemic advantage in this delimited, contingent and pragmatic sense can usefully be assessed 
on three dimensions.15   
8.11 Evidence. Those who negotiate social, legal, and economic institutions from a position of 
marginality come to know, indeed they often have to be attuned to dimensions of the social and natural 
world that can be ignored by those who are comparatively privileged or, indeed, that are systematically 
obscured (or inverted) by dominant world views that legitimate entrenched hierarchies of privilege. For 
example, they may know in intimate detail, how labor is exploited, how material conditions of life and 
social relations are sustained, how power inequities are reproduced and what their consequences are, 
especially for those who are subdominant.16 They may also be attentive to aspects of the natural world 
that reflect their situated interests and needs, interacting with shared biophysical environments in quite 
distinct ways.17  
 
8.12 Inferential heuristics and explanatory models. Differential access to evidence is rarely an 
advantage on its own. Standpoint theorists often point to particular skills at discerning patterns in the 
available evidence that are associated with subdominant status. These include, most obviously, 
inferential acuity with respect to the power dynamics and mechanisms of oppression, and their 
systematicity (across contexts), that those living lives of relative privilege do not need to cultivate. It 
may also take the form of distinctive ‘metaphors, models, analogies, and narratives’ that enable the 
detection of a different selection of ‘nature’s regularities’ than are captured by the conceptual resources 
of dominant culture knowledge systems (Harding 2006, 140). By extension, subdominant knowers may 
develop an expanded repertoire of explanatory hypotheses for making sense of experience that is 
unintelligible on, or indeed radically inconsistent with, dominant categories of sense making.  
 
8.13 Critical distance. Finally, and crucially, standpoint theorists have particularly emphasized the 
kinds of epistemic advantage that arise when marginality enforces critical dissociation from a dominant 
world view, throwing into relief the parochial nature of conceptual categories and norms of credibility 
that are otherwise taken as a given and projected as universal.18 
 
 
13 My use of the term ‘advantage’ is intended to mark a rejection of formulations of standpoint theory that presuppose 
(or advocate) a thesis of ‘automatic privilege,’ as I have described it elsewhere (Wylie 2003, 28-30).  
14 See Fehr (this volume) for discussion of how epistemic advantage of these kinds may be undermined by isolation 
or lack of uptake (forms of testimonial injustice), and by patterns of socialization that reinforce methodological 
conservatism or a disinclination to articulate dissenting perspectives. 
15 This analysis of epistemic advantage is developed in more detail in Wylie (2003, 32-39). 
16 See, for example, Narayan on the reasons to cultivate epistemic humility (1988, 38).  
17 This is a point central to Harding’s arguments for standpoint theory: ‘even in “the same” environment, different 
cultures have different interests in the world around them’ (2006, 140; 99).  
18 See Rooney (this volume) for an analysis of just this kind of epistemic advantage: the meta-philosophical 
advantage, as she describes it, that puts feminists in a position to recognize background assumptions, to articulate 
critical analysis of the limitations they impose, and to develop alternatives to ‘epistemology “proper.”’ Fehr also 
describes in general terms how ‘alternative perspectives,’ arising from situational diversity, ‘can be fruitful in terms of 
providing alternative questions to ask, theories to test and methods with which to generate data’ (mss p. 20). 
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It is in connection with these last two factors—explanatory resources and critical distance—that 
epistemic advantage on the margins is most contingent and most potentially transformative. Born of 
epistemic injustice, it is in the struggle to take critical distance from a dominant world view, to critically 
scrutinize entrenched norms of credibility and formulate interpretive alternatives that a standpoint on 
epistemic agency can (sometimes) emerge from the resources of subdominant situated knowledge. 
When such conditions obtain, standpoint theory is a useful framework for understanding consequential 
patterns of epistemic exclusion or marginalization, and pivotal shifts in understanding that arise when 
insights from marginal standpoints throw into relief the partiality of a dominant world view.  
 
8.2 Activist Research on the Academic Workplace Environment  
Consider, then, the play of epistemic injustice and correlative advantage in the case of the grass-
roots, activist research by which women documented what came to be known, in the 1980s, as the ‘chilly 
climate’ they were encountering in the male dominated disciplines and professions they were then 
entering in record numbers.  
The catalyst for this activist research was growing concern, by the mid-1980s—two decades after 
legal guarantees of equal access had been instituted—that the demographics of college and university 
students had changed dramatically, but improvements in the representation of women in the 
professoriate, and their effective integration into the academy, seemed to have stalled; the pipeline was 
showing definite signs of leaking or, more accurately, of filtering and sluggishness. As Simeone described 
the situation in 1987, qualified women were still ‘more likely than men to be unemployed, underemployed, 
or in part-time non-tenure track positions’; they were disproportionately concentrated in less prestigious 
institutions; they showed substantially higher rates of attrition, advanced through the ranks more slowly 
and, at the same rank, were paid less than their male counterparts. 19 
It was at this juncture, in the early 1980s, that women who had successfully navigated the training 
pipeline, and who expected academia to be a model meritocracy—’fair’ in all the senses Cole defended 
for the sciences—found themselves increasingly frustrated by just the kinds of inequitable ‘rates of 
exchange,’ the lack of uptake and patterns of exclusion, that Rossiter brought into focus in her 1981 
response to Cole.20 When the occasion arose to compare their experience with that of other women in 
their local work environment, or in their disciplines and professions, they discovered, often to their 
surprise, that problems they had assumed to be idiosyncratic—to their personal situation, the peculiarities 
of their colleagues, the culture of their institutions or disciplinary subfield—were, in fact, widely shared.21 
This was a process of ‘coming to consciousness’ that has been described in a number of connections; for 
example, Fricker draws on accounts of revelatory insights generated by collective reflection on 
experiences of sexual harassment and post-partum depression to capture the contours and the harms of 
 
19 By the mid-1980s the percentage of women receiving doctorates across all academic fields was nearly twice that of 
women in faculty positions (roughly 17% of faculty were women, compared to 33% of PhDs), and yet their distribution 
across the ranks conformed to the inverted pyramid pattern familiar from twenty years earlier. The percentage of full 
professors who were women remained tiny (roughly 11% in the 1980s in the U.S.; 7% in Canada) but, more telling, 
the percentage of women who were full professors was consistently a third or less than that of men and showed very 
little change over the previous 15 years. Women were slightly better represented in initial appointments to tenurable 
positions than in the relevant candidate pools—a function, it would seem, of equity and affirmative action policies—
but  they continued to swell the lower (most vulnerable) ranks of the professoriate, especially off-ladder ranks: they 
made up a third of assistant professors but 52-55% lecturers and instructors, and they were much more likely to hold 
nonladder positions or to be unemployed than men (the revolving door phenomenon). They were being tenured at 
lower rates than men (two-thirds of men compared to less than half the women), and they continued to be better 
represented less prestigious institutions and in smaller (non-graduate teaching) departments and universities, 
compared to men with comparable graduate training. These details are excerpted from Wylie, Jakobsen, and Fosado 
(2007), and from Wylie (1995b). Fehr (this volume, mss p. 2) provides a summary of current data on the 
representation of women and minorities in STEM fields (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) that 
demonstrates the persistence of these patterns of attrition and the resulting “inverted pyramid” in the distribution of 
women and minorities by rank and institution.  
20 This turning point in thinking about the persistence of gender inequity in academic contexts is reflected in 
contributions to Breaking Anonymity (The Chilly Collective 1995), and described in more detail in Wylie (1995b). 
21 As indicated at the outset, although the STEM disciplines have been a particular focus of attention, especially in the 
public debate generated by the MIT report and by Summers’ remarks, these patterns of marginalization are by no 
means unique to the sciences, and the processes of coming to terms with them that I describe here have taken 
shape across the social sciences and humanities.  
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hermeneutical injustice (2007, 149, 153). In an academic context, Aisenberg and Harrington describe the 
‘shock of recognition’ that galvanized members of the Alliance of Independent Scholars in Cambridge 
(Massachusetts) into action, convincing them of the need to more systematically document the strikingly 
consistent pattern of ‘deflection from expected [tenure track] academic careers’ that emerged when they 
compared their experience in a range of fields at their first meeting in 1980.22 Working groups coalesced 
in academic institutions and societies across North America, undertaking local studies—often interview 
based, workplace ethnographies—in which they documented their experiences and, crucially, struggled to 
develop the conceptual resources necessary to capture emerging commonalities and patterns and to 
name the diffuse sense of alienation that so many described. The Association of American Colleges 
(Project on the Status and Education of Women) published a series of widely influential reports through 
the 1980s in which Hall and Sandler coined the term ‘chilly climate.’ Their growing awareness that, as 
Aisenberg and Harrington put it, they were ‘hearing about a generalized experience’ (1988, ix) is captured 
by the titles of the AAC reports. The first two, published in the early 1980s, posed a question: The 
Classroom Climate: A Chilly One for Women?; and Out of the Classroom: A Chilly Campus Climate for 
Women? (Hall and Sandler 1982, 1984). By 1986 Sandler shifted to the declarative: The Campus Climate 
Revisited: Chilly for Women Faculty, Administrators, and Graduate Students (Sandler 1986).   
Twenty years after the first ‘chilly climate’ working groups had begun to coalesce, the authors of 
the MIT Report on the Status of Women retraced their steps. Nancy Hopkins describes the process by 
which they came to their conclusions about the insidious nature of  ‘post-civil rights’ gender discrimination 
as entirely local and internal (Wilson 1999, A17). When she consulted other senior women in the School 
of Science about persistent problems she faced in attempting to secure additional laboratory space, they 
each discovered that they had been dealing with similar problems in isolation; Hopkins had asked for 
advice about a letter she’d drafted outlining her problems and, in the end, 16 of her colleagues redrafted 
and signed it as a collective ‘letter of protest’ to the Dean of the School of Science, Robert Birgeneau. 
The committee appointed by Birgeneau confirmed their suspicions about an overall pattern of gender 
difference in the distribution of resources, in professional recognition and compensation, and in 
institutional decision making and leadership roles. In addition, this report documented an age-graded 
pattern in these gender disparities. While men and women scientists at MIT start out on an equal footing 
(gender differences proved to be negligible at the junior ranks), the difference between them widens the 
more senior the comparison group.  
What the ‘chilly climate’ reports and pamphlets of the 1970s and 1980s articulate, and what got 
public traction with media coverage of the MIT report in 1999, are two key insights that challenge the 
explanatory framework established by Cole. The first is that gender bias, like other forms of attributional 
bias, exists in the social fabric of everyday interaction; it takes the form of persistent, small-scale, but 
systematically gendered differences in recognition and response, evaluation and expectation. Crucially, 
as Sandler put it in the mid-1980s, this ‘host of subtle personal and social barriers’ often operates ‘below 
the level of awareness of both men and women’ (Sandler 1986, 17), unintended and unrecognized.23 The 
grass-roots reports of the 1980s describe, in this connection, the following standard mechanisms by 
which the workplace is rendered inhospitable for women.24 The most fundamental is an uncritical reliance 
on stereotypic assumptions about women’s capabilities and (appropriate) roles in academia that translate 
into gender normative work assignments, with ramifying effects for recognition, compensation, and the 
 
22 As Aisenberg and Harrington describe this initial meeting: ‘The effect of that [initial] round of stories was 
electrifying. Women who had arrived with the sense that the drama and loss in their own academic careers was more 
or less unique, felt a shock of recognition, hearing their experience in the lives of others previously unknown to them. 
It seemed clear from that one meeting, as women of highly divergent backgrounds and fields told stories with 
strikingly similar plot turns, that we were hearing about a generalized experience’ (1988, ix).  
23 Valian provides a comprehensive overview of the research on cognitive schemas that delineates the role of non-
conscious gender schemas in generating gender-biased patterns of evaluation and interaction (1999). Although the 
grass-roots studies of workplace environment issues I describe here do often cite early studies of evaluation bias, 
they draw very little on this wider body of work on cognitive schemas that was taking shape at the time.  
24 I summarize here an analysis of central themes in the chilly climate literature that were evident by the late 1980s 
and have proven remarkably stable. I argued then that the types of practice documented by these reports fall into 
three broad categories—stereotyping, devaluation, exclusion—each of which may be reenacted in intensified form as 
reprisals against those who draw attention to these practices (Wylie 1995b, 38-40). Fehr (this volume) describes how 
these mechanisms—specifically exclusion and various forms of evaluation bias—can systematically undermine the 
potential epistemic advantages of situational diversity.  
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allocation of resources. Women report being tracked into service and support roles: undergraduate 
teaching, student advising, heavy administrative assignments that typically emphasize ‘housekeeping,’ 
‘hostessing,’ nurturing and facilitating roles. They find themselves disproportionately serving as 
‘associate’ or ‘assistant’ positions rather than leadership roles with decision making power. By extension, 
these studies routinely describe instances in which women confront a double standard in response to 
character traits that are valorized for men (e.g., perceptions of ‘assertiveness’; Valian 1999, 129), and in 
the way their credentials are assessed and projected. The cases described in these reports illustrate 
patterns of evaluation bias that are now well documented by experimental psychologists (Valian 
1999,127-133), and that constitute testimonial injustice on Fricker’s account: men are assumed 
competent until proven otherwise, while women have to demonstrate their competence at every step; 
women’s successes are seen as exceptional, attributed to the support of others or to luck, while their 
failures are treated as all that could be expected. As Sonnert and Holton describe these dynamics in their 
study of elite women scientists, women find themselves suspect, under ‘heightened critical scrutiny,’ with 
implications for their interactions with colleagues, research style, and publication patterns (1995, 156, see 
also Fehr this volume, mss p. 20). Finally, a recurrent theme in these studies—as signalled by the ‘chilly 
climate’ metaphor—is that women often report a sense of isolation: they lack both formal and informal 
mentoring; they find they are cut off from key communcation networks in their work units and disciplines 
(the ‘sports buddy,’ ‘locker room’ phenomena, as some described it). As a consequence, they report 
being disproportionately affected by a lack of institutional transparency about performance expectations, 
resources, and procedures.  
The second key insight, articulated with particular clarity by the authors of the MIT report, is a 
corollary to the first: small-scale differences in expectation, work assignment, recognition, and social 
integration, of the kind that chilly climate researchers had documented through the late 1970s and 1980s, 
can result in substantial and persistent gender differences in career trajectories and outcomes, manifest 
in everything from lifetime earnings profiles to striking age-graded differences in job satisfaction. Rossiter 
dubs this pattern of cumulative disadvantage the ‘Mathilda effect’ (1993), inverting Merton’s model of 
cumulative advantage, the famous ‘Matthew effect’ (1968).25 At the time that chilly climate researchers 
were documenting the micro-dynamics of workplace environments, a robust body of statistical analysis of 
the demographics of academia was taking shape that has documented these outcomes on a large 
scale.26 
The response to these studies, when they first appeared in the 1980s, is a particularly telling 
indicator of what was at stake, epistemically as well as politically. Three recurrent themes in the public 
reactions of senior administrators, the media coverage, and the resulting public debate about chilly 
climate studies are particularly relevant here: denial of the facts as presented; denial that they stand as 
evidence of systematically gendered differences; and denial that, even if substantiated, instances or 
patterns of gender difference (e.g., in uptake, response, support, or outcomes) demonstrate unfairness in 
any sense that warrants intervention to change the situation.27  
The first standard response was disbelief and indignation: the authors of chilly climate reports, 
and those whose experience they report, must be malicious or deluded (Wylie 1995a [1989], 159-160). 
The critics typically observed that they had never witnessed or heard of any incidents like those described 
in chilly climate reports, therefore they could not have occurred as described. Most striking are cases 
where, for example, the critics enacted, in their condemnation of these reports, precisely the patterns of 
gender normative stereotyping and evaluation bias the existence of which they were intent on denying.28 
 
25 The reference here is to Matthew (13:12): ‘For whomsoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more 
abundance; but whomsoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath.’ Rossiter settled on the 
‘Mathilda Effect’ after considering a number of possibilities; this is in honor of a 19th century sufferagette, Mathilda 
Gage who, Rossiter argues, developed a critical perspective on the impact of these differences on women’s 
contributions to collective understanding: what I would describe as a standpoint (1993).  
26 Sonnert and Holton (1995) describe this pattern in the cohorts of high achieving women scientists they studied, 
making use of comparisons with a male control group. Xie and Shauman (2003) provide a detailed overview and 
assessment of large scale demographic studies, and Ginther’s analyses of a persistent gender gap in compensation 
across academic and professional fields is an example of this work (e.g., 2004, 2009).  
27 I draw here on published accounts of the response to chilly climate reports that appeared in the 1980s, chiefly as 
described by the Chilly Collective (1995). 
28 In a discussion of the extremely hostile and high profile response of the President of the University of Western 
Ontario to a 1989 report, I observed that, in the end, this ‘highly charged reaction to the Chilly Climate Report’ did 
 
 9 
The contours of both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice are clearly evident in these exchanges. It 
was more plausible to those who were not subject to or who benefit from such bias that the ad hoc 
working groups, who undertook the hours of interviews and the labor of assembling and distributing these 
reports, must have falsified the incidents they described, or must have deliberately sought the notoriety of 
a ‘media event’ (as one set of critics described it), than that the patterns of marginalization they reported 
could really be commonplace in the meritocratic culture of the academy. In the case of one such report 
(Backhouse, Harris, Michell, Wylie 1995 [1989]), aggrieved university administrators objected that the 
interviewees were ‘hiding behind anonymity’; in not self-identifying, those whose accounts were reported 
must be assumed to have ‘made it all up’ (Wylie 1995a [1989], 159). Despite entrenched conventions of 
research ethics in the social sciences that require interviewers to protect the identities of research 
subjects, the content of the report was so evidently unsettling, so threatening in it’s illegibility, that 
anonymity was taken to be evidence of deceit and malicious intent.29 Here the hermeneutical lacunae that 
rendered chilly climate phenomena inscrutable served to reinforce already entrenched suspicions about 
the testimonial credibility (the truthfulness and the competence) of the women who reported them. The 
irony is that it is precisely these patterns of credibility deficit—amplified and rendered explicit in public 
debate—that chilly climate authors strove to capture in their accounts of the persistent, demoralizing 
experience of finding their intellectual and professional contributions ignored, discounted, or attributed to 
others.  
Even when the facts of chilly-making incidents and practices were accepted as reported, a 
second response was to deny their status of as evidence of any systematic difference in the treatment of 
women as compared to their male peers: each instance must be explicable other terms, as idiosyncratic 
to the event, the individual, the situation, a localized conflict or misunderstanding, or to a generally hostile 
environment, such that no gendered pattern emerges in the details. Certainly it is challenging to 
demonstrate that there are robustly gendered patterns in small-scale, often unintended and unrecognized 
differences in response, recognition, inclusion. Chilly climate researchers typically started with individual 
women’s stories, following well-established feminist practices of oral history and auto-ethnography that 
serve to create spaces, in collective discussion, interviews, testimonial writing, in which women can begin 
to articulate, in their own terms, experience that does not fit normative expectations. But however 
powerful the ‘shock of recognition’ when striking and persistent similarities suggested that these stories 
embody systematic differences in attribution of credibility, recognition and response, the qualitative nature 
of these accounts rendered them suspect, especially for those who have no counterpart in their own 
experience to that which is reported. Here again both hermeneutical and testimonial injustice configured 
the debate. Chilly climate researchers confronted a ‘gap in collective interpretive resources’ (Fricker 2007, 
1) that put them at a disadvantage in at least two distinct but powerfully interconnected senses. The 
challenge they faced was to work against the grain of a set of presuppositions that both animate and 
obscure the very phenomena they were struggling to capture: presuppositions about the nature of 
cognitive authority and discrimination that privilege the role of deliberate intention both in individual action 
and as embodied in explicit policies. The methods of inquiry they relied on to do this—comparative 
enthnography, textual and qualitative anlaysis—were precisely what was needed to identify previously 
unrecognized ‘microinequities’ and patterns of ‘subtle discrimination’, and the hermeneutical lacunae that 
rendered them inscrutable. And yet, in delivering insights that disrupted dominant expectations, these 
methods were further discredited. On these assumptions, even if the resonances evident in the reported 
experience of academic women proved to be widespread (a ‘generalized experience’ in the statistical 
sense), any claim of systematicity would remain implausible so long as there was no evidence of 
deliberate intent to discriminate on the part of individuals, or of explicit institutional barriers to the training, 
appointment, funding of women academics or to their research and publishing opportunities. The heuristic 
gap that rendered gendered patterns illegible in this domain was the lack of an explanatory mechanism 
conventionally recognized to be capable of generating systematic differences in women’s experiences 
and academic career paths.  
 
more to ‘illustrate, graphically and publically, the problems we had hoped to document than any amount of 
‘anonymous’ reporting could have done’ (1995, 51).  
29 The senior administrators in question quickly backed away from this line of critique, but it continued to be a 




A final objection to chilly climate studies draws out the normative implications of this last point. 
Even when systematic gender differences were successfully documented, either in a particular context or 
as a pervasive feature of academic life, the critics of chilly climate studies routinely denied that they 
reflect any unfairness either on the part of individuals or institutions; if no harm was intended, and no 
intent to discriminate had been demonstrated, allegations of injustice were unfounded. Cole’s argument in 
Fair Science depends on these presuppositions, and they routinely resurface in contemporary debate; 
they are evident, for example, in the argments made by those who defended Summers’ remarks (e.g., 
Pinker 2005). Two elements of this paradigm are relevant here. The first is that discrimination, as a form 
of injustice, is not just a matter of unintended consequences, or unfortunate inequities in the distribution of 
resources or rewards, however systmatic they may be. It is, by definition, a consequence of intentional 
action that is morally culpable; only if harm is intended, or directly enough caused to be attributed to an 
individual, is it morally or politically salient. The second assumption is a resolutely internalist conception of 
agency that sharply delimits an individual agent’s moral accountability. Reasons for action that are 
introspectively accessible to an epistemic or moral agent—their conscious beliefs and intentions, and 
judgements that arise from deliberation on them—are the only relevant grounds for explaining their 
actions and the only legitimate basis for attributing responsibility for the outcomes of action. Each of these 
presuppositions has generated vast philosophical literatures and are certainly untenable as they stand, 
but in their vernacular form they are never far from the surface in public debate about the claims central to 
chilly climate reports, and are sometimes ardently defended by the critics of these reports.30 So long as 
they frame discussion of women’s workplace experience, they powerfully counteract the possibility that 
the persistent, often ‘subtle’ differences in treatment reported in chilly climate reports could be recognized 
as systematic, or as discrimnatory.  
Indeed, the problem with which chilly climate researchers and activists grappled was not just a 
lack of conceptual tools adequate to the task of capturing interpretively opaque experience—a function of 
gaps in the available hemeneutical resources, as Fricker describes it (2007, 148)—but the constraints 
imposed by dominant conventions of sense-making that foreclosed the possibility of recognizing the 
phenomena in question. On the presuppositions about agency that chilly climate researchers strove to 
make explicit, it was deeply implausible that systematically gendered patterns of evaluation bias and 
interaction might arise from internalized cognitive schemas that operate ‘below the threshold of 
consciousness’ or that such ‘micro-inequities’ in interaction have the capacity to generate large scale 
differences in opportunity and outcome for women (Rowe [1973] 1990). Moreover, it was quite literally 
inconceivable that we might (collectively and individually) be accountable for the effects of these 
dynamics, given complementary normative assumptions about the nature of discrimination. In the case of 
climate studies that focus on academia, these hermeneutical barriers are compounded to the extent that 
the defining feature of these communities and institutions, and the cornerstone of their epistemic 
credibility, is a commitment to regulative ideals of intellectual meritocracy.31 In short, the central claims of 
chilly climate studies about the cumulative effects of diffuse ‘microinequities’ were categorically 
implausible given the (resolutely externalist) self-understanding and epistemic authority of their own 
academic communities. The cost to those who attempted to name and to report forms of experience that 
called these assumptions into question was further erosion of their credibility as epistemic agents.  
 
8.3 Epistemic Injustice and the Resources of Situated Knowledge 
 
How did chilly climate researchers render intelligible to themselves the diffuse but persistent 
problems they continued to face even when anti-discrimination laws had long been in place and overt 
discrimination was (largely) a thing of the past? And what changed between the early 1980s and 1999 
such that the central tenets of their analysis could get significant public traction with publication of the MIT 
report and, subsequently, through arguments for the extension of Title IX provisions to graduate training 
in the sciences (Munro 2006, Zare 2006)? 
Where the first question is concerned, my thesis is that chilly climate researchers drew chiefly on 
the resources of their own situated, experience-based knowledge to develop what they could only 
 
30 See, again, the review one such debate in Breaking Anonymity (Chilly Collective 1995) and the defenses of 
Summers that appeared a decade later.  
31 Rooney (this volume) offers a striking example, in the marginalization of feminist epistemology, of how critical 
challenges are deflected by appeal to entrenched epistemic ideals of objectivity and neutrality. 
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describe metaphorically as an inhospitable ‘climate.’ In particular, apart from scattered references to early 
evaluation bias research and appeals to statistics on the representation of women in academia that 
demonstrated the need to look beyond ‘civil rights era’ barriers to access, their work was largely 
uninformed by a growing body of disciplinary research in the cognitive and social sciences that would 
ultimately vindicate their central insights. I return to this point shortly. The situated knowledge on which 
grass roots chilly climate researchers did depend incorporates each of the elements I identified at the 
outset as loci of epistemic advantage, but with some telling twists.  
 
8.31 Evidence. Social psychologists have articulated a principle of informational asymmetry that 
fleshes out the empirical detail of an insight that has long been central to feminist standpoint theory: it 
is that ‘in any relationship defined by differential power (like gender), the dominant group (e.g., men) 
can afford to be oblivious to certain kinds of social cues, while the subordinate group (women) 
cannot’; consequently, ‘dominants and subordinates have very different levels and kinds of 
information about each other’ (Stewart and McDermott 2004, 529; citing Fiske 1993). In some cases 
this asymmetry ensures that subordinates and outsiders have access to evidence that the privileged 
do not in a quite literal sense. This is an insight routinely exploited by mystery writers, from Agatha 
Christie to Barbara Nealy, whose fictional investigators are discounted for precisely the attributes that 
put them in a position to learn crucial facts about means and motivation that elude normatively 
credible witnesses.32 The case of chilly climate research is more complicated in several respects. 
Women academics are, in principle, insiders to the ‘sacred grove’ (Aisenberg and Harrington 1988), 
not sojourners or invisible outsiders; what mobilized (some) to take up chilly climate projects was 
typically dissonance between their expectations—rooted in a deeply held commitment to the 
meritocratic ideals of their chosen fields and, often, considerable privilege in other respects—and 
evidence from their direct experience of academic institutions. Chilly climate authors catalog 
moments of rupture in which a particular juxtaposition of responses or judgments throws into relief a 
double standard (e.g., the same credentials are read in very different ways), or a growing unease 
about gender inequity in the outcomes of deliberation (e.g., on appointments or admissions, 
publication or promotion) that alerts them to a persistent disconnect between the purportedly gender 
neutral norms of academic accomplishment and the highly gendered characteristics of the qualities 
that conventional working indicators tend to track.33 They register shock and anger at what they 
slowly and often grudgingly came to recognize as pervasive, gendered patterns of credibility overspill 
and credibility deficit—testimonial injustice; evaluation bias—that had been invisible to them, and that 
remained largely inscrutable to those who better fit these dominant norms and benefit from them.  
 
8.32 Inferential heuristics and explanatory models. Given the hermeneutic deficits facing the 
insiders who struggle to articulate this dissonant experience, chilly climate projects were explicitly and 
agonizingly exploratory. The process of coming to consciousness described by Aisenberg and 
Harrington, and by Hopkins, was an irreducibly collective and comparative undertaking. It was a 
matter of creating from the ground up the conceptual tools and interpretive heuristics necessary to 
reconceptualize systematic disadvantage in terms of the ‘climate’ of a workplace, rather than its 
architecture, and to identify mechanisms that might generate large-scale discriminatory outcomes 
‘despite good will,’ through inflicting ‘a thousand cuts’ or by suffocation under ‘a ton of feathers’ 
(Caplan 1993).  
 
8.33 Critical distance. As this suggests, the situated experience that made chilly climate researchers 
aware of gendered ‘micro-inequities’ afforded them a critical advantage in discerning the ways in 
which the institutions and practices of academia fall short of its ideals. The ruptures created by finding 
that gender makes a difference to who counts as a credible knower—whose ‘merit’ becomes a 
medium of exchange in a meritocracy—enforced a critical dissociation from norms and conventions of 
academic practice which, in turn, made it possible to recognize the disconnect between what working 
indicators of epistemic credibility actually track and what they are claimed to track. It was 
 
32 Elsewhere I develop an analysis of evidential advantage in terms of Nealy’s character Blanche White, a crime 
solving African American housekeeper (Wylie 2003). 
33 These are the mechanisms by which systematic forms of ignorance and underlying (taken for granted) 
assumptions become visible to those on the margins, or to insider-outsiders (Rooney this volume, mss p. 14).  
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asymmetries in extant ‘working indicators’ of epistemic credibility that chilly climate researchers both 
documented and exploited. 
In recent years a number of high profile reports have appeared that systematically rebut the 
lingering presuppositions of Cole’s paradigm, as revivified by Summers,34 bringing to bear the results of 
research that probes the mechanisms responsible for evaluation bias and documents the cumulative 
effects of small scale gender biases in uptake and response. These reports demonstrate that fields as 
diverse as experimental psychology, sociolinguistics, and economics have substantiated many of the 
conclusions drawn, tentatively and quite independently, from the dissonant experience documented by 
grass roots ‘chilly climate’ researchers. It is now well established that factors operating below the 
threshold of conscious awareness—cognitive schemas of various kinds—condition the adjudication of 
academic merit in the review of credentials, in assessing grant proposals, and in weighing the authority of 
publications. These effects are documented by studies of cognitive schemas, stereotype mobilization, and 
ascriptive bias in social and cognitive psychology (Steele 1997, Valian 1999); by the work by 
sociolinguists on small-scale interaction patterns that reproduce social hierarchy (Ridgeway 1992); and by 
sociological studies of institutional structures that can foster or counteract these dynamics (Reskin 
2003).35 In addition, since the early 1990s, models of the dynamics by which women and minorities are 
deflected from and marginalized within academia (especially in the STEM disciplines36) recognize the 
interactive and cumulative effects of small scale disadvantage, giving the Mathilda effect a central place 
in their analyses (Cole and Singer 1991; Sonnert and Holton 1995). Finally, large scale quantitative 
analysis of national databases delineate, with growing precision, a persistent ‘gender gap’ in such 
measurable indices of recognition as salary, and document the age-graded patterns of cumulative 
disadvantage predicted by these models in the analysis of large-scale national data bases (Xie and 
Shauman 2003).37  
 
No doubt a great many factors contributed to the sea change in the reception of chilly climate 
reports, from the early 1980s when they first began to appear to 1999 when the MIT report drew national 
attention. But certainly one key factor is a shift in the interpretive resources available in public discourse 
about ‘post-civil rights’ discrimination as a consequence both of the grass-roots chilly climate research 
and of these proliferating research programs in the social sciences and psychology.38 By the turn of 2000 
it was no longer radically incomprehensible that our judgments and behaviors might be substantially 
shaped by non-conscious cognitive schemas, or that large scale, morally and epistemically consequential 
inequities might arise from unintended and unrecognized differences in treatment of men and women.  
 
 
34 For example, the National Academy of Sciences report, Beyond Bias and Barriers (2007), and the AAUP report, 
Faculty Gender Indicators (West 2006). Although the NAS report frames its mandate in general terms without 
reference to Summers, it responds point for point to Summers’s claims demonstrating that the best empirical 
research available renders untenable the stereotypes and conventional assumptions he invokes. 
35 For example, Ceclia Ridgeway calls for attention to the micro-structure of interaction as the level at which gender 
stratification is generated: like the double standards at an interactional level that Fosci describes as mechanisms by 
which structural inequities are maintained. And Barbara Reskin (in a 2002 Presidential Address to the American 
Association) inveighs against the continued focus on ‘motives’ and argues for focusing on ‘organizational- and 
societal-level mechanisms’—patterns of practice; systems of accountability; degree of transparency and formalization 
in an organization; design of work—that allow cognitive schemas to work / that perpetuate the double standards and 
patterns of ascriptive bias that underpin them. 
36 Science, technology, engineering and medicine (STEM). 
37 These show, for example, that gender gaps in productivity are not as marked as Cole claimed and have been 
diminishing; control for an enormous range of factors cited as possible reasons for women’s different employment 
and compensation profiles (various forms of self-selection, demographic or market factors) shows a persistent gap 
that seems only attributable to residual gender discrimination, especially at higher ranks and more elite schools; the 
pipeline proves to be more porous that assumed and to be leaking at different places for different disciplines. 
38 In a response to Summers, Valian observes that ‘although an abundance of research of this sort exists, it has not 
become part of our common understanding and thus has not yet redressed the imbalances between men and women 
in professional life’ (2005). While I agree in general terms—certainly, there is much to be done to integrate insights 
about cognitive schemas into our understanding and our practices—the outcry generated by Summers’ remarks 
suggests that the resources available for understanding the status of women in male dominated fields had shifted 
significantly since the time when Cole could take for granted that his reading audience would accept terms of his 
analysis (with the exception of a few critics like Rossiter).  
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8.4 Conclusion  
 
In this analysis of the insights central to chilly climate reports on ‘post-civil rights era sex 
discrimination,’ I have argued that chilly climate researchers posited a set of generative mechanisms—
elements of an alternative explanatory paradigm for understanding both their own localized experience 
and the patterns they discerned in this experience when they had occasion to compare it with other 
women in their fields and institutions. Although few directly engage Cole, the explanatory models they 
offer directly counter the conventional presuppositions made explicit by Cole and, 25 years later, by 
Summers; they show how gender normative behavior can give rise to systematic, large scale and 
ramifying differences in outcomes for academic women in the absence intentional discrimination or formal 
barriers to their participation.  
At the same time, however, the more radical epistemic implications of this alternative chilly 
climate paradigm are routinely blunted by its staunchest advocates. As one outspoken advocate for 
gender equity in the physical sciences likes to put it, the institutions of her science are sexist to the core, 
but ‘quarks have no gender’; inequities in the application of epistemic norms—a reliance on working 
indicators of rational authority that relegate women to the margins—have no bearing whatsoever on the 
conceptual, empirical integrity of the science. The problem to be resolved is strictly a matter of testimonial 
injustice; for meritocratic ideals to be realized what must be rectified are systematic patterns credibility 
deficit and overspill, the misrecognition of epistemic agents. It is assumed that ideals of excellence—the 
substantive norms of credibility that define what counts as a well formed question and a credible 
answer—are impervious to the influence of factors that are recognized to distort their application when 
intellectual merit is adjudicated in the context of hiring, tenuring, promoting, awarding grants to, and 
publishing particular individuals. In fact, it is hard to see how systematic testimonial injustice could fail to 
entrench patterns of hermeneutical injustice, even in fields that deal with manifestly non-gendered subject 
matters. If, for example, patterns of workplace segregation obtain such that women typically work in a 
narrow range of subfields or on  particular types of problems, and if the results of women’s work gets less 
support and recognition than that of their male peers, given standard gender biases in citation and 
funding, then the evidence and insights women generate will have less impact on their field as a whole 
than the work done by men in areas where they dominate. Testimonial injustice thus translates into 
biases in the research agenda and in the epistemic resources available to the research community that, 
to varying degrees and in diverse ways, shape the trajectory of a discipline as a whole. It is the possibility 
that institutional inequity may have an impact on the content of their fields that many equity activists flatly 
refuse to consider. To take up these questions would require more than the resources of situated 
experience which brought testimonial injustice into sharp focus; it would require a well articulated critical 
standpoint on knowledge production. 
It is perhaps unsurprising that equity activists would draw strong conclusions about testimonial 
injustice, delineating innumerable ways in which gender schemas determine (unfairly) who counts as a 
credible knower and who gets credit for contributions to the collective store of authoritative disciplinary 
knowledge, but deny that these injustices have any impact on the epistemic integrity and hermeneutical 
resources of the disciplines within which they work. The challenge of rendering the experience of 
epistemic injustice communicable is particularly acute in academic, especially scientific contexts because 
it calls into question the community norms of credibility to which chilly climate researchers are held 
accountable and to which they themselves subscribe. In many contexts, these community norms include 
a proscription against any appeal to experience, and yet it was women’s dissonant experience (as 
scholarly or scientific insiders but gender outsiders) that threw into relief the contours of the cognitive 
schemas and localized interaction patterns that generate persistent patterns of testimonial injustice. The 
cost of relying on the epistemic advantages of situated knowledge, for many, was a resolve to 
circumscribe its import, sharply dissociating the claims they make about institutional inequity from any 
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